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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. From a conceptual perspective, (infra 3.2) the JCE doctrine serves
to impute certain criminal acts or results to persons for their par-
ticipation in a collective (‘‘joint’’) criminal enterprise. The ‘‘criminal
enterprise’’ is deﬁned by a common – explicit or tacit – agreement or
understanding to commit certain criminal acts for an ultimate crim-
inal objective or goal. The underlying rationale of a JCE, its core
feature, is the combined, associated or common criminal purpose1 of
the participants in the enterprise. The common purpose is the col-
lective element of the JCE doctrine which links the members among
themselves2 and turns it into a theory of collective responsibility.
2. JCE I resembles traditional co-perpetration, since the participants
act on the basis of a common plan (‘‘common design’’ or ‘‘common
enterprise’’). If one construes JCE I as containing objective and
subjective elements, in the sense of the functional control concept, it
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1 J. Vogel, ‘‘Individuelle Verantwortlichkeit im Vo¨lkerstrafrecht’’, (2002) 114
Zeitschrift fu¨r die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 403, at 421; see also E. van
Sliedregt, ‘‘Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for
Genocide’’, (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) 184, at 200, 203.
2 Cf. H. van der Wilt, ‘‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’’, (2007) 5 JICJ 91, at 99 et seq.,
107. However, an additional agreement between the superior and the direct perpe-
trators is not necessary, see infra note 9.
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can be considered as a form of co-perpetration within the meaning of
Art. 25 (3) (a) alt. 2 ICC Statute and, as such, as a form of commission
pursuant to Art. 7 (1) ICTY/Art. 6 (1) ICTR Statutes. JCE II can be
treated as a sub-category of JCE I if it is interpreted narrowly. In a
broad sense of an extension of liability, JCE II rather resembles JCE
III. JCE III cannot be considered as a form of co-perpetration, but
only as a form of aiding and abetting the criminal enterprise. It is an
autonomous concept of imputation which does not constitute com-
mission in the sense of Art. 7 (1) ICTY/Art. 6 (1) ICTR Statutes. In
fact, JCE III demonstrates most clearly the JCE doctrine’s similarity
to classical conspiracy liability, as it even holds a participant in a
criminal enterprise responsible for the crimes of other participants
not explicitly agreed upon beforehand, provided that they are fore-
seeable. Thus, the liability is essentially based on the membership in
the group pursuing the JCE and, as such, conﬂicts with the principle
of culpability.
3. For the application of the JCE doctrine before the ECCC (Part IV
of this brief) this means that one must distinguish between the three
forms of JCE. The test to be applied follows from the principle of
legality recognized in International Criminal and the ECCC Law
(4.1). Per the wording of Art. 29 (1) ECCC Law, JCE I can be
considered ‘‘commission,’’ as it resembles co-perpetration in a tra-
ditional sense, JCE III only entails accomplice liability and as such
does not constitute commission, and with JCE II, it depends if it is
understood in the sense of JCE I or JCE III (4.2).
4. As to the customary law status of JCE, again a diﬀerentiation is
necessary (4.3). Although JCE I liability was recognized by postWorld
War II case law and, therefore, also existed at the time of the com-
mission of the crimes in question in Cambodia, this is not the case with
regards to JCE III and JCE II, unless it is interpreted in the narrow
sense as a sub-category of JCE I. This is conﬁrmed byCambodian Law
applicable at the time of commission (4.4): only JCE I existed unam-
biguously, while JCE III was clearly not encompassed by the Code of
1956; as to JCE II, it is only covered if it is construed as a sub-category
of JCE I. Consequently, only JCE I and JCE II (in a narrow sense) are
applicable law for the case at hand.
II PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The author has been asked to prepare an amicus curiae brief on the
following two issues:
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(1) The development of the theory of JCE and the evolution of the
deﬁnition of this mode of liability, with particular reference to
the time period 1975–1979;
(2) The application of JCE as a mode of liability before the ECCC,
taking into account the fact that the crimes were committed
during the period of 1975–1979.
I deal with these issues by dividing my submission into two parts.
In the ﬁrst (general) part (infra III), drawing on earlier works,3 I will
explain JCE by referring to modern case law (3.1) and its purpose and
conceptual (‘‘dogmatic’’) structure (3.2). I will then compare JCE to
the traditional forms of participation in order to more exactly classify
the three forms of JCE identiﬁed by the case law and prepare the
ground for the second (special) part (IV) In this part, I will examine if
JCE is, ﬁrst, applicable under the ECCC law and/or, second, can be
applied retroactively to the crimes committed during 1975–1979.
III GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1 JCE in Modern Case Law
The JCE doctrine4 can be traced back to the Tadic´ Appeals Chamber
Judgment.5 The Chamber looked for a theory of participation in
international crimes which takes suﬃciently into account the collec-
tive, widespread and systematic context of the commission of such
crimes and, thus, helps to overcome the typical problems of proof
with regard to the – sometimes hardly visible – contributions of
individual participants. The Chamber correctly acknowledged that
‘‘most of (…) these crimes (…) constitute manifestations of collective
criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups or individuals
3 I rely in this part especially on my paper ‘‘Joint criminal enterprise and command
responsibility’’, (2007) 5 JICJ 159.
4 According to A.M. Danner and J.S. Martinez, ‘‘Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of Interna-
tional Criminal Law,’’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 75, at 107, 64% of the
indictments submitted to the ICTY between 25 June, 2001 and 1 January, 2004 relied
on this doctrine. On the importance of JCE, also see N. Piacente, ‘‘Importance of the
JCE Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy,’’ (2004) 2 JICJ 446, at 448;
M. Osiel, ‘‘The Banality of the Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity,’’
(2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1751, at 1783.
5 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 15
July, 1999, § 185 et seq.
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acting in pursuance of a common criminal design’’.6 The Chamber
distinguished, relying on post World War II case law (on this reliance
in more detail infra 4.2) three categories of collective criminality7:
(1) the basic form where the participants act on the basis of a
‘‘common design’’ or ‘‘common enterprise’’ and with a common
‘‘intention’’ (hereinafter ‘‘JCE I’’);
(2) the systemic form, i.e., the so-called concentration camp cases
where crimes are committed by members of military or admin-
istrative units such as those running concentration or detention
camps on the basis of a common plan (‘‘common purpose’’)
(hereinafter ‘‘JCE II’’);
(3) the so called ‘‘extended’’ joint enterprise where one of the co-
perpetrators actually engages in acts going beyond the common
plan, but his or her acts still constitute a ‘‘natural and foresee-
able consequence’’ of the realization of the plan (hereinafter
‘‘JCE III’’).
The objective elements of JCE liability are threefold:
(1) a plurality of persons;
(2) the existence of a common plan, design or purpose; and
(3) the participation of the accused in the JCE by any ‘‘form of
assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common
purpose’’.
Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber tried to give the objective
elements of JCE a more precise meaning by developing the following
6 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 191; Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Judgment,
Case No. IT-00-39-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 27 September, 2006, § 876: ‘‘JCE is well
suited to cases such as the present one, in which numerous persons are all said to be
concerned with the commission of a large number of crimes.’’ Critically about the
JCE’s ability to deal with macrocriminality, see: van der Wilt, supra note 2, at 101:
‘‘[…] the doctrine does not tally with the reality of modern bureaucracies that engage
in systematic mass crime.’’ For another view: K. Gustafson, ‘‘The Requirement of an
Express Agreement’ for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability,’’ (2007) 5 JICJ 134, at
149, argues that JCE ‘‘allows for, and even requires, a broader approach in which the
contributions of that individual are analyzed in the context of criminal conduct
carried out jointly by a group of actors.’’ (at 139). In the same vein: A. Cassese, ‘‘The
Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal
Enterprise,’’ (2007) 5 JICJ 109, at 110–111.
7 Cassese, supra note 6, at 111 et seq. calls these three forms ‘‘liability for a
common intentional purpose,’’ ‘‘liability for participation in an institutionalized
common criminal plan’’ and ‘‘incidental criminal liability based on foresight and
voluntary assumption of risk.’’
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criteria8: as to the plurality of persons, it is not necessary to identify
eachmember by name; as to the common purpose, the prosecutormust
determine precisely the objective, the temporal, geographic etc. scope
and that the purpose is eﬀectively common for all members of the
JCE9; last but not least the prosecutor must prove a signiﬁcant con-
tribution10 of the accused in the execution of the purpose of the JCE. In
addition, the Chamber made clear that the direct perpetrators do not
necessarily have to belong to the JCE (I), i.e., it is possible for the
superiors (e.g., the leadership of a totalitarian regime) to form a JCE
among themselves and use direct perpetrators who do not belong to
this JCE (although they may eventually belong to a parallel JCE) for
the execution of their objectives. In order to impute in this case the
crimes of the ‘‘external’’ direct perpetrators to themembers of the JCE,
it is necessary to prove at least the existence of a nexus between the
direct perpetrators and their acts with at least one member of the JCE
and that this member acted by virtue of a common agreement between
8 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Judgment, Case No. IT-99-36-A, ICTY Appeals Cham-
ber, 3 April, 2007, § 430. See also Prosecutor v. Martic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-
11-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 12 June, 2007, §§ 435-40, recently approved by the
Appeals Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 8
October, 2008, §§ 79-85; Prosecutor v. Krajisˇnik, Judgment, Case No. IT-00-39-A,
ICTY Appeals Chamber, 17 March, 2009, §§ 156–157.
9 An additional agreement (between the superior and the direct perpetrator) is, in
addition to the common purpose, not necessary, see: Brdanin Appeals Judgment,
supra note 8, § 418: ‘‘In cases where the principal perpetrator shares that common
criminal purpose of the JCE or, in other words, is a member of the JCE, and commits
a crime in furtherance of the JCE, it is superﬂuous to require an additional agree-
ment between that person and the accused to commit that particular crime.’’ Con-
curring: Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-03-66-A, ICTY Appeals
Chamber, 27 September, 2007, § 104; Prosecutor v. Mrksic´, Judgment, Case No.
IT-95-13/1-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 27 September, 2007, § 545; Prosecutor v.
Boskoski, Judgment, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 10 July, 2008, §
395. In the same vein: Gustafson, supra note 6, at 147 et seq., criticizing the sentence
of the Trial Chamber. Defending its position: Cassese, supra note 6, at 125–126; van
Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 201. In any case, there seems to be consensus as to the
requirement of a common purpose or plan as the basis of attribution, while an
additional agreement to commit speciﬁc crimes is not necessary (see also: van
Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 200). See also: Krajisnik Trial Judgment, supra note 6, §
884, 1120 requiring ‘‘joint action’’ in the sense of interaction or co-ordination;
concurring: A. Zahar and G. Sluiter, International Criminal Law (2008), 255–256.
10 Brdanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 430; Mrksic´ Trial Judgment, supra
note 9, § 545; Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 9, § 395. Critical about this
requirement: Gustafson, supra note 6, at 141; in favour: Cassese, supra note 6, at
128, 133; K. Hamdorf, ‘‘The Concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise and Domestic
Modes of Liability for Parties to a Crime,’’ (2007) 5 JICJ 208, at 225.
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF ON JCE 357
all the members of the JCE.11 In this way, the Chamber creates a form
of indirect co-perpetration (or co-perpetration by way of others) of the
members of the JCE with regard to the direct perpetrators who, how-
ever, are not mere instruments of the superiors.12 While these
requirements equally apply to JCE I, II and III, the subjective
requirements vary according to the category of JCE13: JCE I requires
the shared intent of the (co-) perpetrators; JCE II demands personal
knowledge of the system of ill-treatment; JCE III requires an intention
(i) to participate in the criminal purpose and further this purpose, on
the one hand, and (ii) to contribute to the commission of a crime by a
group, on the other. Responsibility for a crime which was not part of
the common purpose arises if the commission of this crime was fore-
seeable and the accused (willingly) took that risk.
The subsequent ICTY/ICTR case law basically followed the Tadic´
ruling.14 As to the newmixed tribunals, only theEast Timorese Special
11 Brdanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, §§ 410 et seq., 430; Mrksic´ Trial
Judgment, supra note 9, § 547; Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 9, § 397; Pro-
secutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Judgment Case No. ICTR-01-73-T, ICTR Trial Chamber,
18 December, 2008, § 384; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-
05-87-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 26 February, 2009, §§ 98–99; Krajisˇnik Appeals
Judgment, supra note 8, § 235; In the same vein: Gustafson, supra note 6, at 147 et
seq., 154 et seq.
12 For this reason it is puzzling if the prosecutor refers to the direct perpetrators as
‘‘tools’’ who are used by the members of the JCE (cf. Brdanin Appeals Judgment,
supra note 8, § 412).
13 Cf. Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, §§ 196, 202, 220, 228; concurring:
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Judgment, Case No. IT-97-25-A, ICTYAppeals Chamber, 17
September, 2003, § 32;Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic´, Judgment, CaseNo. IT-98-32-A, ICTY
Appeals Chamber, 25 February, 2004, § 101; Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakir-
utimana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-10; ICTR-96-17, ICTR Appeals Chamber, 13
December, 2004, § 467 with further references; Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Judgment, Case
No. IT-97-24-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 22 March, 2006, §§ 65, 101; Mrksic´ Trial
Judgment, supra note 9, § 545; Martic´ Trial Judgment, supra note 8, § 439; Martic´
Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 83; Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 9, § 396;
Zigiranyirazo Trial Judgment, supra note 11, § 385;Milutinovic´ Trial Judgment, supra
note 11, §§ 107–112.
14 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Furundzˇija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1, ICTYAppeals
Chamber, 21 July, 2000, §§ 117 et seq.;KrnojelacAppeals Judgment, supra note 13, § 29
et seq.; Vasiljevic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, §§ 95 et seq.; Stakic´ Appeals
Judgment, supra note 13, §§ 64, 65;Mrksic´ Trial Judgment, supra note 9, §§ 545 et seq.;
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, Brahimaj, Judgment, CaseNo. IT-04-84-T, ICTYTrial
Chamber, 3April, 2008, §§ 135 et seq.;Milutinovic´ Trial Judgment, supra note 11, §§ 95
et seq. For the ICTR see: Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, §§ 462 et
seq.; Prosecutor v. Simba, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-01-76, ICTR Trial
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Panel for Serious Crimes15 has so far applied the JCE doctrine.16 The
Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (‘‘ICC’’) in the
Lubanga and in the Katanga & Ngudjolo cases17 has dissociated itself
from the JCE doctrine, at least as far as it goes beyond mere co-per-
petration in the sense of Art. 25 (3) (a) ICC Statute, i.e., in its systemic
Footnote 14 continued
Chamber, 13 December, 2005, §§ 386–388; conﬁrmed by the Appeals Chamber,
Judgment, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, ICTR Appeals Chamber, 27 November, 2007,
§§ 250 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-01-63-T, ICTR
Trial Chamber, 12 November, 2008, § 327; Zigiranyirazo Trial Judgment, supra note
11, §§ 383 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T,
ICTR Trial Chamber, 27 February, 2009, §§ 24 et seq.
15 SeeProsecutor v. Perreira, Judgment, CaseNo. 34/2003, Special Panel for Serious
Crimes, 27 April, 2005, at 19–20, (www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/
spsccaseinformation2003.htm [visited 16 October, 2008]). Concurring also: Ibid.,
Separate Opinion of Judge Phillip Rapoza, at 4–5, §§ 17–18, 25. See also: Prosecutor v.
Domingos de Deus, Judgment, Case No. 2a/2004, Special Panel for Serious Crimes,
12 April, 2005, at 13 (www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/spsccase
information2004.htm [visited 15 October, 2008]); Prosecutor v. Cardoso, Judgment,
Case No. 04/2001, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, 5 April, 2003, §§ 367 et seq.
(www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/spsccaseinformation2001.htm [vis-
ited 16 October, 2008]). Meanwhile, also the Special Court for Sierra Leone has
adopted the JCE doctrine, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
SCSL Trial Chamber, 2 March, 2009, §§ 252 et seq.
16 As to the indictments before the Sierra Leone Special Court invoking JCE III,
see: Danner and Martinez, supra note 4, at 155–156.
17 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the conﬁrmation of charges,
ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic
Rep. of Congo, 29 January, 2007, §§ 326–329; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Conﬁrmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-
717, ICC Pre Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Rep. of Congo, 30
September, 2008, §§ 480 et seq. The Chamber associates the JCE doctrine with the
subjective approach in the law of co-perpetration, i.e., the determination of co-per-
petration essentially by taking recourse to the intention or will of the parties. It then
dismisses this approach and, therefore, implicitly also the JCE doctrine. See thereto F.
Jessberger/J. Geneuss, ‘‘On the Application of a Theory of Indirect Perpetration in
Al Bashir. German Doctrine at The Hague?’’, (2008) 6 JICL 853, at 858. Nevertheless,
A. T. Cayley, ‘‘The Prosecutor’s Strategy in Seeking the Arrest of Sudanese President
Al Bashir on Charges of Genocide’’, (2008) 6 JICL 829, at 838–839 argues for the
application of the JCE doctrine in the proceedings against Al Bashir.
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(JCE II) and extended forms (JCE III). It remains to be seen if these ﬁrst
decisions herald the end of JCE at the ICC.18
3.2 Purpose and Conceptual (‘‘dogmatic’’) Structure
The JCE doctrine serves to impute certain criminal acts or results to
persons for their participation in a collective (‘‘joint’’) criminal
enterprise. The ‘‘criminal enterprise’’ is deﬁned by a common – ex-
plicit or tacit – agreement or understanding to commit certain
criminal acts for an ultimate criminal objective or goal, e.g. in the
case of a genocidal enterprise, the ultimate destruction of the tar-
geted group. Such a global or broad enterprise normally consists of
various smaller (‘‘subsidiary’’) sub-enterprises,19 e.g. the running of
concentration or prison camps for the members of the targeted
group, the locally or regionally organized persecution of members of
the group, etc.20 The participants in the enterprise are bound to-
gether by their common will to achieve the ultimate goal by all means
necessary, i.e. by the crimes that must be committed on the road to
the ultimate criminal goal. The underlying rationale of a JCE, its
core feature, is the combined, associated or common criminal pur-
pose21 of the participants in the enterprise. The common purpose is
the collective element of the JCE doctrine which links the members
among themselves22 and turns it into a theory of collective respon-
sibility based on an institutional-participatory23 or a systemic24
18 See also T. Weigend, ‘‘Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration in the
Lubanga Decision on Conﬁrmation of Charges,’’ (2008) 6 JICJ 471, at 478; Jess-
berger/Geneuss, supra note 17, at 867.
19 Cf. Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, ICTY Trial
Chamber, 2 November, 2001, § 307.
20 Critical on such broad interpretations: Danner and Martinez, supra note 4, at
135 et seq.; critical also: Osiel, supra note 4, at 1796 et seq., 1802 et seq. and id.,
‘‘Modes of Participation in Mass Atrocity,’’ (2005) 39 Cornell International Law
Journal 793, at 799–800.
21 Vogel, supra note 1, at 421; see also: van Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 200, 203.
22 Cf. van der Wilt, supra note 2, at 99 et seq., 107. Yet, an additional agreement
between the superior and the direct perpetrators is not necessary, see supra note 9.
23 Cf. H. Jung, ‘‘Begru¨ndung, Abbruch und Modiﬁkation der Zurechnung beim
Verhalten mehrerer’’, in A. Eser, B. Huber, K. Cornils (Eds.), Einzelverantwortung
und Mitverantwortung im Strafrecht (1998), 175 at 183 et seq.; in favour of a ‘‘form of
criminal participation:’’ van Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 201–202.
24 Cf. Vogel, supra note 1, at 420 et seq.; see for a systemic imputation (‘‘global
approach’’) also: Piacente, supra note 4, at 446 et seq.
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model of imputation or attribution. Insofar, the doctrine resembles
the law of conspiracy25 and the membership or organizational lia-
bility as applied in Nuremberg.26
This general explanation needs further diﬀerentiation with regards
to the three forms of JCE identiﬁed by the case law. This, in turn,
presupposes an analysis of JCE with regard to the traditional law of
participation.
3.3 JCE I and Traditional Forms of Participation
While traditional (national) doctrine cannot simply be transposed
without further ado to international criminal law (ICL), since it
focuses on the role and contribution of perpetrators in an individual
instead of a collective or systemic setting, it still helps explain and
systematize the forms of imputation and participation in ICL. It also
provides for forms of collective participation as the examples of
conspiracy and membership liability show. In fact, the JCE doctrine
can be traced back to the English common purpose theory,27 i.e., a
kind of subjective co-perpetration. From the perspective of a diﬀer-
entiating concept of participation, the delimitation of co-perpetration
and mere complicity (aiding and abetting) is crucial and runs along
25 Cf. G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principle of
Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’’, (2005) 3 JICJ 539, at 548; E. van Sliedregt, The
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law (2003), 355; S. Powles, ‘‘Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by
Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?’’, (2004) 2 JICJ 606, at 613; Pia-
cente, supra note 4, at 451; Danner and Martinez, supra note 4, at 118–119; Osiel,
supra note 4, at 1785, 1791–1792; van der Wilt, supra note 2, at 96. For a diﬀerent
view, see: van Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 201.
26 See for a detailed analysis: van Sliedregt, supra note 25, at 17 et seq., 20 et seq.,
352 et seq. (regarding JCE as ‘‘membership responsibility’’ distinguishing between
‘‘institutionalised’’ and ‘‘collateral’’ membership responsibility); Danner and Mar-
tinez, supra note 4, at 113–114; S. Ro¨mer,Mitglieder verbrecherischer Organisationen
nach 1945 (2005), at 28 et seq.; Osiel, supra note 4, at 1799–1800. Yet, Piacente, supra
note 4, at 452, argues in favour of the Nuremberg ‘‘judicial recognition of the
common illegal purpose.’’
27 It goes back to the fourteenth century when liability was based on a ‘‘common
consent’’ (see A.T.H. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity
[1991], at 209, note 1). Later, in the seventeenth century, the private law concept of
‘‘acting in concert’’ or ‘‘conspiracy’’ was used to punish speciﬁc agreements to
commit unlawful acts (see Ordinance of Conspirators, 1305, 33 Edw. 1; generally
Note [1959] 920, 922–923). See also more recently: V. Haan, Joint Criminal Enter-
prise. Die Entwicklung einer mitta¨terschaftlichen Zurechnungsﬁgur im Vo¨lkerstrafr-
echt (2008), 198.
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the lines of the degree of the (objective) participation in the (sub-
jective) criminal plan. In other words, with a decreasing degree of
participation, co-perpetration comes closer to mere aiding and
abetting, and the delimitation between them becomes blurred.
While the Tadic´ Appeals Chamber did not clarify whether the JCE
doctrine belongs to the traditional law of participation or constitutes
a new and autonomous form of criminal imputation, some judgments
have at least acknowledged the problem of the correct form of
participation and opted for a subjective solution. In Kvocˇka et al., a
Trial Chamber, in this respect critical of the Tadic´ Appeals Judgment,
considered that aiding and abetting in its traditional form may
also be applied in relation to a JCE, and the diﬀerence between
co-perpetration and aiding and abetting is a subjective one: If ‘‘the
participant shares the intent of the criminal enterprise,’’ he is a
co-perpetrator, if he ‘‘only’’ possesses knowledge, an aider and
abettor to the JCE.28 A few paragraphs later, however, the Chamber
recognizes that there is also an objective side to the distinction: an
aider or abettor may graduate to a co-perpetrator if his participation
‘‘lasts for an extensive period or (he) becomes more involved;’’29 the
kind of participation depends on ‘‘the position in the organizational
hierarchy and the degree of (…) participation.’’30 A co-perpetrator
performs a more active role, ‘‘either through committing violations of
human rights in his own right or through the pervasiveness of his
inﬂuence;’’ an aider and abettor plays a more limited role, basically
doing his job discreetly.31 In any case, ‘‘[L]iability for foreseeable
crimes ﬂows to aiders and abettors as well as co-perpetrators’’ of the
JCE.32 The Appeals Chamber does not see an objective diﬀerence
between aiding and abetting a single crime or a JCE. In both cases, a
‘‘substantial contribution’’ is necessary.33 The diﬀerence is a subjective
one: where the accused knows he is aiding and abetting a single crime,
he is liable with regard to that crime, even if the principal perpetrator
belongs to a JCE; where the accused knows that he helps a group
crime, part of a JCE, and shares the group’s intent, he is liable for
28 Kvocˇka Trial Judgment, supra note 19, § 273.
29 Ibid., § 284.
30 Ibid., § 306.
31 Ibid., § 328.
32 Ibid., § 327.
33 Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, ICTY Appeals
Chamber, 28 February, 2005, § 90.
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furthering that JCE as a co-perpetrator.34 In Ojdanic´, the Appeals
Chamber states that JCE is a form of commission ‘‘insofar as a par-
ticipant shares the purpose of the JCE (…) as opposed to merely
knowing about it’’ and, therefore, ‘‘cannot be regarded as a mere aider
and abettor (…).’’35 This in turn means that if the participant only has
knowledge, he can only be liable as an aider and abettor.
It follows from these considerations that the question of the correct
form of participation is linked to the question of whether aiding and
abetting a JCE is possible at all.While theKvocˇkaTrial Chamber takes
this view, the Appeals Chamber only applies aiding and abetting to the
single crime object of the complicity. While this restrictive viewmay be
based on the wording of Art. 7 (1) ICTY Statute – since it makes a
distinction between JCE, included in the term ‘‘committed’’, and
‘‘otherwise aided and abetted’’ – it is not necessary from a doctrinal
perspective. On the contrary, as follows from the Kvocˇka Trial
Chamber’s concrete application and from the English law on common
purpose, diﬀerent forms of participation in a JCE are perfectly possi-
ble. The aider and abettor to a single crime committed within the
framework of a JCE is still an aider and abettor to the JCE as such,
except that this single crime is completely unrelated to the JCE. As to
the diﬀerence between co-perpetration and aiding and abetting, the
most convincing criteria are oﬀered by the doctrine of the functional
domination of the act (funktionelle Tatherrschaftslehre), widely rec-
ognized in civil law systems and recently also by the ICC’s Pre-Trial
Chamber.36 According to this theory, co-perpetration presupposes a
functional cooperation of various persons (objective element) on the
34 Ibid.; concurring Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-03-66-T,
ICTY Trial Chamber, 30 November, 2005, § 510; Limaj et al. Appeals Judgment,
supra note 9, §§ 99 et seq.; in favour of a subjective diﬀerentiation also: Cassese,
supra note 6, at 116.
35 Prosecutor v. Ojdanic´, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic´ Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction- JCE, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 21 May,
2003, § 20; Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-97-24-T, ICTY Trial
Chamber, 31 July, 2003, § 432.
36 Lubanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, supra note 17, §§ 322 et seq. where the
co-perpetration, on the basis of Art. 25 (3) (a) ICC Statute, is characterised as ‘‘joint
control over the crime as a result of the essential contribution’’ (§ 322), ‘‘coordinated
individual contributions of a plurality of persons’’ (§ 326) and, relying on the Ger-
man theory of a ‘‘concept of control over the crime’’ (§ 338), as a ‘‘division of the
essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime between two or more persons
acting in a concerted manner’’ (§ 342). Conﬁrmed by Katanga & Ngudjolo Conﬁr-
mation of Charges, supra note 17, §§ 480 et seq. (with regard to indirect perpetration
or perpetration through another person).
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basis of a common plan or agreement (subjective element).37 If one
follows this functional control concept, the requirements of co-perpe-
tration are only fulﬁlled by JCE I, and only if it is construed as an
objective-subjective structure, requiring, beyond the mere common
purpose orwill (subjective element), the actual performance of the act(s)
by the member(s) of the enterprise (objective element). It seems as if the
Tadic´ Appeals Chamber acknowledged this kind of identity between
co-perpetration and JCE I, calling JCE I ‘‘co-perpetratorship’’38 and
comparing it to co-perpetration as invoked in the German and Italian
post-WorldWar II cases.39 It also seems that the ICTY/ICTR case law
adopts the objective-subjective approach if it requires for JCE I that the
participant ‘‘perform(s) (objective) acts that in some way are directed
to the furthering of the (subjective) common plan or purpose’’.40 Thus,
it seems correct to conclude that JCE I is a form of participation
modeled on civil law co-perpetration41 and common law42 common
37 See for a detailed analysis: C. Roxin, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil (2003), Vol. II,
at 77 et seq.
38 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 198. This terminology is settled; see
recently: Prosecutor v. Babic´, Judgment on Sentencing Appeals, Case No. IT-03-72,
ICTY Appeals Chamber, 18 July, 2005, § 38.
39 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 201; see also: Ibid., § 220 equating JCE
I with co-perpetration.
40 Ibid., § 229; Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, § 33; Vasiljevic´ Ap-
peals Judgment, supra note 13, § 102; Kvocˇka Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, §
89; Babic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 38, § 38; Milutinovic´ Trial Judgment, supra
note 11, § 103.
41 Cf. van Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 198–199. See also Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra
note 35, § 439. Against this background and the universal recognition of co-perpe-
tration as a form of participation (see only Art. 25 [3] [a] 2nd alt. ICC Statute), it is
more than surprising when the Appeals Chamber states that, on the one hand, ‘‘(T)his
mode of liability (…) does not have support in customary international law (…)’’ but,
on the other, JCE liability is ‘‘ﬁrmly established’’ (Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, supra
note 13, § 62). This demonstrates such a blatant ignorance of basic principles of
criminal law that even principled supporters of the International Criminal Tribunals,
such as this writer, must rethink their support (critical also: H. Ola´solo, ‘‘Reﬂections
on the Treatment of the Notions of Control of the Crime and Joint Criminal
Enterprise in the Stakic´ Appeals Judgment,’’ [2007] 7 International Criminal Law
Review [ICLR] 143, at 153–154.) In any case, the co-perpetration is explicitly recog-
nised in Art. 25 (3) (a) ICC Statute, as was correctly held by the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber in Lubanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, supra note 17, §§ 317 et seq.
42 While the Anglo-American Law on ‘‘complicity’’ requires a (causal) contribu-
tion of the accomplice, the JCE doctrine renounces this requirement and thus
overcomes, from a prosecution perspective, this ‘‘defect’’ of the ‘‘normal’’ Anglo-
American law; see: van Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 196–197.
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purpose/design, i.e., it is a sui generis concept of ICL based on both
common and civil law.43
The diﬃcult issue is what (objective) acts are required for JCE I.
The Kvocˇka Trial Chamber correctly says that the ‘‘precise threshold
of participation in JCE has not been settled.’’44 The famous ruling by
the Tadic´ Appeals Chamber, adopted by most of the subsequent case
law, according to which ‘‘participation’’ in the common design (read
JCE) ‘‘may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the
execution of the common plan or purpose,’’45 blurs the line between
JCE I, understood as co-perpetration, and the other forms of JCE,
especially JCE III. The Appeals Chamber’s attempt to distinguish
between co-perpetration and aiding and abetting fails since it only
addresses, on the one hand, the relationship between principal
(perpetrator) and aider and abettor, and, on the other, the sub-
jective requirement of the agreement, leaving aside the diﬀerence
between the objective contribution of the person acting on the basis
of a common purpose (read: co-perpetrator) and the mere aider and
abettor.46 In fact, if one takes the objective distinction of the
Appeals Chamber seriously, an aider and abettor would do more
than a co-perpetrator: the former carries out substantial acts
‘‘speciﬁcally directed’’ at assisting the perpetration of the (main)
crime, while the latter must only perform acts (of any kind) that ‘‘in
some way’’ are directed to the furthering of the common plan or
purpose.47 This turns the traditional distinction between co-perpe-
tration and aiding and abetting, i.e. the distinction with regard to
the weight of the contribution, which must be more substantial in
the case of co-perpetration, on its head. The only way to make
sense of the argumentation of the Chamber would be to interpret
the contribution of the accomplice member of a JCE as more
important than that of the perpetrator (not part of the JCE) of the
43 Van Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 202.
44 Kvocˇka Trial Judgment, supra note 19, § 289.
45 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 227; concurring: Krnojelac Appeals
Judgment, supra note 13, § 31; Vasiljevic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, § 100;
Babic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 38, § 38; Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment,
supra note 13, § 467; Martic´ Trial Judgment, supra note 8, § 440; Martic´ Appeals
Judgment, supra note 8, § 79; Krajisˇnik Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 215.
46 Cf. Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 229.
47 Ibid., § 229; concurring: Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, § 33;
Vasiljevic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, § 102; Kvocˇka Appeals Judgment, supra
note 33, § 89.
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speciﬁc crime since the former contributed to the ‘‘risk’’ or ‘‘general
danger’’ represented by the JCE as such. In other words, the
importance of the contribution changes with the object of reference
as an individual or a collective crime. Interestingly enough, the
Vasiljevic´ Appeals Chamber, albeit following the Tadic´ Appeal
distinction, takes the view in the same paragraph that the partici-
pant in a JCE is liable as a co-perpetrator and as such incurs a
higher degree of responsibility than an aider and abettor who, in
any case, would always be an accessory to the co-perpetrators of
a JCE.48 While this correctly describes the distinction between
co-perpetration and complicity, it is imprecise with regard to the
form of JCE – only JCE I constitutes, as a rule, co-perpetration –
and contradictory with regard to the Tadic´ Appeals Chamber’s
position which, as we have seen, attributes more weight to the
contribution of the accomplice. Yet, one cannot have it both ways.
Either JCE I is – in my view correctly – equated with co-perpe-
tration and the corresponding rules apply, especially with regard to
the delimitation of aiding and abetting, or the form of participation
is left open at the level of attribution and diﬀerences are only, at
best, taken into account at the sentencing level.49
3.4 JCE II and III as Autonomous (Systemic) Concepts of Imputation
In the light of these considerations, it is now possible to classify JCE
II and JCE III. As to JCE III, it seems clear that its imputation of an
act as a ‘‘foreseeable consequence’’ which was not agreed upon
beforehand and consequently not intended by all participants can
hardly constitute a form of co-perpetration or of perpetration at all if
it is required, as explained above, that the perpetrator himself fulﬁll
all objective and subjective elements of the oﬀence. For in JCE III,
one or more of these elements are missing and only imputed to the
member of the enterprise by way of vicarious liability (responsabilite´
du fait d’autrui), i.e. by taking recourse to the act of another person,
the actual perpetrator, transposing this act to the ‘‘non-actor’’ or
‘‘non-act’’ of that member. Yet, this non-act can only be considered
48 Vasiljevic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, § 102.
49 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, ICTR Trial
Chamber, 1 December, 2003, § 963; Vasiljevic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, §
182; Babic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 38, § 40; Milutinovic´ Trial Judgment,
supra note 11, § 106. Critical: Danner and Martinez, supra note 4, at 141–142.
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as a form of aiding and abetting to the crime in question. This is
conﬁrmed by traditional English doctrine which has long held that
participants in a common criminal purpose are principals (only) in the
second degree (i.e. accessories) in respect of every crime committed by
any of them in the execution of that purpose.50
In the case of JCE II, the situation is more complicated and
depends on the understanding of this category. If one characterizes
JCE II as a ‘‘variant’’ or sub-category of JCE I51 with the same
requirements, it can certainly be treated in the same manner. If,
however, following the Kvocˇka Appeals Chamber, a ‘‘substantial
contribution’’ to the enterprise is not necessary, but membership and
foreseeability alone give rise to criminal responsibility, such a broad
understanding of JCE II resembles rather JCE III52 than JCE I, and
as such cannot be considered a co-perpetration. In this case, JCE II
(in the broad sense) must structurally be classiﬁed, like JCE III, as a
form of aiding and abetting a criminal enterprise and the additional
question arises whether JCE II and III are encompassed by Art. 7 (1)
ICTY/Art. 6 (1) ICTR Statute and Art. 25 (3) ICC Statute at all. As
to Art. 7 (1) ICTY/Art. 6 (1) ICTR Statute, JCE II and III may only
be subsumed under the ‘‘otherwise aided and abetted’’ formula if one
construes the ‘‘otherwise’’53 as including any complicity in collective
commission. Yet, aiding and abetting, as understood in the ICTY
and ICTR Statutes and also Art. 25 (3) (c) ICC Statute, diﬀers on the
mental side from JCE II and III: it requires, on the one hand,
knowledge54 or intent (within the meaning of Art. 30 ICC Statute)
and, on the other, an act ‘‘for the purpose of facilitating the com-
mission of such a crime.’’ Thus, the only form of participation
comparable to JCE II or III is the one of collective responsibility laid
50 See: D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (12th ed. 2008), at 182, quoting
JF. Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law (9th ed. 1950), Arts. 37 and 38. See also:
Ormerod, op. cit., at 206–208 (JCE as cases of secondary participation, parties to
JCE as accessories).
51 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 203, 228.
52 Consequently, Powles, supra note 25, at 610 considers that for many of the
so-called camp cases, the basis for liability is JCE III instead of II.
53 Contrary to the Ojdanic´ Decision, supra note 35, § 19 the term ‘‘otherwise’’ does
not suggest that the modes of liability set out in Art. 7 (1) are not exhaustive;
correctly: Powles, supra note 25, at 611.
54 See also: Powles, supra note 25, at 612–613 seeing an incompatibility of aiding
and abetting and JCE III.
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down in Art. 25 (3) (d) ICC Statute. In fact, the Tadic´ Appeals
Chamber considered that this form of responsibility contains a
‘‘substantially similar notion’’ and ‘‘upholds’’ the JCE doctrine,55 yet
this view suﬀers from a lack of diﬀerentiation between the categories
of JCE created by this very decision.
While JCE I constitutes, as shown above, a form of co-perpetra-
tion within the meaning of Art. 25 (3) (a) 2nd alt. ICC Statute,
JCE II and III are not included in Art. 25 (3) (d) for at least two
reasons.56 First, subparagraph ii of Art. 25 (3) (d) requires ‘‘knowl-
edge’’ with regard to the criminal intent of the group, i.e. more than
mere foreseeability as required by JCE II and III.57 Secondly, while
one may argue that JCE II and III are covered by Art. 25 (3) (d) (i)
since the voluntative element of this subparagraph (‘‘aim of fur-
thering the criminal activity […]’’) is not incompatible with fore-
seeability,58 the contribution to the collective crime must, in any
case, be ‘‘intentional’’ (Art. 25 [3] [d] 1st cl.), i.e., requires more than
mere foreseeability.59 In addition, given the similarity between
55 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 222. For a general similarity also: K.
Khan and R. Dixon, Archbold: International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure
and Evidence (2nd ed. 2005), §§ 10–25; K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law
(2002), at 236 et seq.; W. Schabas, An Introduction to the ICC (3rd ed. 2007), at 212;
J.D. Ohlin, ‘‘Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal
Enterprise,’’ (2007) 5 JICJ 69, at 85; Gustafson, supra note 6, at 158 (without further
explanation); Cassese, supra note 6, at 132.
56 Critical also: Powles, supra note 25, at 617–618. For a diﬀerent view: van
Sliedregt, supra note 25, at 107–108.
57 Cf. van Sliedregt, supra note 25, at 108. As to JCE II however, she argues that it
can be brought under subparagraph (d) (ii) as to mid-level participants, if they had
knowledge of the system of ill-treatment. See, however, her position in infra note 62
with main text.
58 In this sense: Ohlin, supra note 55, at 85.
59 The counter argument of Cassese, supra note 6, at 132, demanding an extensive
interpretation of the term ‘‘intentional’’ (requiring that ‘‘the intent be referred to the
common criminal plan, and, as such, may also embrace acts performed by one of the
participants outside that criminal plan…’’) conﬂicts with the principle of legality, in
particular with the prohibition of analogy provided for in Art. 22 (2) ICC Statute;
the same applies to his interpretation of ‘‘knowledge’’ in Art. 25 (3) (d) (ii) extending
it to a ‘‘foresight and voluntary taking of a risk.’’ The contradiction between
‘‘intention’’ and ‘‘foreseeability’’ can only be resolved by distinguishing between the
objects of reference of the intention required in Art. 25 (3) (d): while the concrete
contribution of the participant to the collective act may well be intentional, she does
not act intentionally with regard to the excesses, they only have to be ‘‘foreseeable’’
to her.
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responsibility based on JCE and conspiracy,60 the inclusion of the
former in Art. 25 (3) (d) would, as stated above, conﬂict with the
will of the drafters of the ICC Statute, who explicitly rejected
conspiracy and drafted Art. 25 (3) (d) as a compromise formula.
Against this background, Art. 25 (3) (d) can rightly be seen as a
‘‘statutory surrogate of JCE.’’61 For the future case law of the ICC,
this means that the application of JCE II (in the broad sense) and
III on the basis of Art. 25 – and this is the only basis it has – is not
possible.62 This would ultimately mean introducing the law of
conspiracy through the backdoor, ignoring the will of the drafters
of the Rome treaty and violating the principle of legality. Only an
explicit codiﬁcation could reconcile JCE II and III with this prin-
ciple’s requirement for a, inter alia, strict and precise construction of
criminal law provisions (Art. 22 [2] ICC Statute).63 All this leads to
the conclusion that JCE II and III constitute autonomous (systemic)
concepts of imputation without an explicit basis in codiﬁed ICL.
3.5 Special Consideration: JCE III and the Principle of Culpability
The principle of culpability or guilt has long been recognized in ICL.
In general, the case law has recognized that the principle of (personal)
guilt requires the Defendant’s knowledge of the circumstances of the
oﬀence. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal referred to
the principle in the context of the question of criminal accountability
of certain Nazi-organizations, stating that ‘‘one of the most impor-
tant (legal principles)… is that criminal guilt is personal, and that
mass punishments should be avoided’’ and that ‘‘the Tribunal should
make such declaration of criminality (of an organization or group) so
far as possible in a manner to ensure that innocent persons will not be
punished.’’64 In the IMT’s conception ‘‘personal guilt’’ meant that the
accused would be individually responsible in objective and subjective
terms and that no defense would negate his or her responsibility. In
the subsequent trials, it was frequently repeated that individual
60 Supra note 25 and main text.
61 Fletcher and Ohlin, supra note 25, at 546, 549.
62 In the same vein: van Sliedregt, supra note 25, at 354; for another view: Ohlin,
supra note 55, at 78 et seq. who, however, proposes a restrictive interpretation with a
view to the requirements of intention, foreseeability and culpability. For another
view, in the result, see also the authors quoted in supra note 61.
63 See also: Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra note 35, § 433.
64 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (The
Blue Series), Vol. I, at 256.
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responsibility presupposes personal guilt.65 Similarly, the ICTY’s
Appeals Chamber recognized the principle of culpability in the Tadic´
case, stating that ‘‘nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts
or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some
other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa).’’66 Although the
principle is not explicitly contained in the ICC Statute, it clearly
follows from the applicable law, either – in the light of the foregoing
jurisprudence – as a principle and rule of international law within the
meaning of Art. 21 (1) (b) of the Statute or as a general principle of
law within the meaning of Art. 21 (1) (c) of the Statute. Under ECCC
Law, the principle is recognized as part of the fair trial principle
enshrined in Art. 33 new and as the other (substantive) side of the
presumption of innocence (Art. 35 new [1]).
The conﬂict of JCE III with the principle of culpability is obvious.
If, according to JCE III, all members of a criminal enterprise incur
criminal responsibility even for criminal acts by some members which
have not been agreed upon by all members before the actual com-
mission but are, nonetheless, attributed to all of them on the basis of
foreseeability, the previous agreement or plan of the participants as the
basis of reciprocal attribution and, thus, a general principle in the law
of co-perpetration is abolished.67 The existence of causality between
the initial agreement or plan and the criminal excess does not
overcome the deﬁcit of culpability.68 In addition, the foreseeability
65 U.S. v. Krauch & Others, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (The Green Series, hereinafter TWC),
Vol. VIII, at 1081–1210, 1155–1156, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160; U.S. v. Krupp & Others,
TWC, Vol. IX, at 1327–1484, 1331, 1448; U.S. v. von Leeb & Others, TWC, Vol. XI,
at 462–697, 484. See also: U.S. v. Flick & Others, TWC, Vol. VI, at 1187–1223, 1208
(‘‘reasonable and practical standards’’ for the determination of guilt).
66 Compare: Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 186 with further references.
See also recently: Martic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 82.
67 See K. Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Vo¨lkerstrafrechts (2nd ed. 2004), at 557
et seq.; id., supra note 3, at 174. See also: Martic´ Appeal Judgment, supra note 8,
Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Individual Criminal Responsibility of
Milan Martic´, at 134, § 7: ‘‘…the current shifting deﬁnition of the third category of
JCE has all the potential of leading to a system, which would impute guilt solely by
association’’.
68 This is ignored by Cassese, supra note 6, at 119 when he argues that there is a
‘‘causal link between the concerted crime and the incidental’ crime…’’.
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standard is neither precise nor reliable.69 Quite ironically, one may say
that the foreseeability standard applied in this way makes the pun-
ishability for the accused unforeseeable. For this very reason – the
insecurity of the foreseeability standard – one cannot blame the
member of the JCE for not having withdrawn from the criminal
enterprise: how and why should he do so if he does not even foresee the
criminal result with certainty?70 Ultimately, the doctrine introduces a
form of strict liability with this standard.71 While this may just be the
reason for the attractiveness of the doctrine for the prosecution, i.e.,
the possibility of elegantly overcoming the typical evidentiary prob-
lems in international criminal law crime scenarios, especially where
proof of direct participation is lacking,72 it turns out to be its main
disadvantage from the defense perspective.
Some of the judges also seem to have problems with the foresee-
ability standard. They either downgrade co-perpetration in a JCE to
aiding and abetting (a JCE or a single crime)73 or try to increase or
modify the subjective threshold by requiring knowledge together with
foreseeability. According to the Appeals Chamber ‘‘this question must
be assessed in relation to the knowledge of a particular accused.’’ The
prosecution must prove ‘‘that the accused had suﬃcient knowledge
such that the additional crimes were a natural and foreseeable
69 Cf. Fletcher and Ohlin, supra note 25, at 550. See also the examples given by
V. Haan, ‘‘The development of the concept of joint criminal enterprise at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’’, (2005) 5 ICLR 167, at
191–192.
70 Crit. also Ola´solo, supra note 41, at 157–158. For this reason Cassese’s argu-
ment, (supra note 6, at 120) that the culpability of the member of the JCE lies in the
fact that he has not ‘‘prevented the further crime, or disassociated himself from its
likely commission’’ is not convincing. In fact, it presupposes something (possible
knowledge of the crime) which needs to be proved in the ﬁrst place (this actual
knowledge) and therefore is a classical petitio principii.
71 See also: van Sliedregt, supra note 25, at 106 et seq., 357 et seq.; Schabas, supra
note 53, at 216; G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (2005), at
292–293; Haan, supra note 69, at 200; Fletcher and Ohlin, supra note 25, at 550. If
this is true, it is not possible to construe a responsibility based on negligence as done
by Ohlin, supra note 55, at 83.
72 Cf. Vogel, supra note 1, at 421; Haan, supra note 69, at 172 et seq.; Danner and
Martinez, supra note 4, at 134; van Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 187.
73 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ICTY Trial
Chamber, 17 January, 2005, § 704 et seq., 713; Kvocˇka Trial Judgment, supra note
19, § 273 et seq.
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF ON JCE 371
consequence to him.’’74 While with knowledge more is required than
with the Tadic´ dolus eventualis or recklessness standard,75 the linkage
between knowledge and foreseeability is by no means clear. If one
gives both standards a subjective meaning, i.e. referring to the mens
rea of the concrete participant who shall be held responsible for the
acts beyond the scope of the enterprise, the combination of them is like
trying to square the circle. Either an accused knows that a certain
result will occur or this result is foreseeable to him; both are logically
impossible. In fact, knowledge is a standard for intent crimes (see Art.
30 ICC Statute), while foreseeability belongs to the theory of reck-
lessness or negligence. The only way out of this impasse is to construe
foreseeability as an objective requirement (in the sense of the notori-
ous reasonable man standard) leaving the knowledge standard as the
(only) subjective or mental requirement of liability.76 Obviously, this
makes life for the defense more diﬃcult, since it is easy for the pros-
ecution and/or judge to allege that the ‘‘reasonable man’’ would have
foreseen the criminal result and it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, for the
defense to rebut this aﬃrmation. As a consequence, JCE III respon-
sibility presupposes, ﬁrstly, the objective foreseeability of the crimes
that went beyond the object of the enterprise (since normally such
crimes occur in the ordinary course of events pursued by such an
enterprise) and, secondly, the knowledge of the concrete participant
with regard to this (objective) foreseeability.77 To put it more simply:
74 Kvocˇka Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, § 86; concurring: Limaj et al. Trial
Judgment, supra note 34, § 512; Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 9, § 396.
75 See supra after note 13 and main text: the accused (willingly) took that risk.
76 This view has been adopted by the Krajisnik Trial Judgment, supra note 6, §
882. The same position is taken by Cassese, supra note 6, at 123, but with the
argument (among others) that international crimes are normally committed in armed
conﬂict and they are so serious that the foreseeability threshold must be lowered.
Ohlin, supra note 55, at 81 conﬂates the objective and subjective if he requires
foreseeability of the defendant, i.e., argues subjectively, and, in the next phrase,
aﬃrms that ‘‘if it is objectively foreseeable that other members of the enterprise
might extend their actions beyond their agreement, then all members (…) can be
charged with the crime’’.
77 Although the case law is not clear, such an objective-subjective interpretation
may be read into various statements requiring awareness with regard to possible
(unintended) crimes, see e.g.: Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic´, Decision on Form of
Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, Case No.
IT-99-36, ICTY Trial Chamber, 26 June, 2001, § 31; Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´, Judgment,
Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 29 July, 2004, § 33. See also: Powles,
supra note 25, at 609. More recently: Haradinaj Trial Judgment, supra note 14, § 139:
‘‘The objective element does not depend upon the accused’s state of mind. This is the
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the participant must know that the crimes in question normally occur
in the given enterprise. Yet, while this interpretation may make sense
with regard to the otherwise illogical combination of knowledge and
foreseeability and, in addition, may bring JCE III into line with the
principle of culpability, it does not help in cases where the accused
credibly pleads a lack of knowledge with regard to the foreseeability,
i.e. argues that he – psychologically – was not aware of the – nor-
matively construed – foreseeability of the excessive crimes. In this
case, he would incur an error or mistake and the question would arise
what type of mistake – of fact or law – would be applicable and what
consequences this mistake would entail. Obviously, the recourse to the
complex theory of mistake of law would not be necessary if one were
to take into account the actual perception ex ante of the concrete
accused instead of subjecting him to the reasonable man standard.
The opposite tendency is the expansion of the foreseeability
standard to speciﬁc intent crimes and this is highly relevant with
regard to genocide. The Brdanin Appeals Chamber78 downgraded
the speciﬁc genocidal intent in the case of a JCE III to mere fore-
seeability, thereby bypassing the speciﬁc intent requirement and
overcoming the well known evidentiary problems. The Milosˇevic´
Chamber merely followed this approach.79 Yet the approach is by
no means settled in the case law. Unlike the Appeals Chamber, the
Stakic´ and Brdanin Rule 98 Trial Chambers held that the speciﬁc
(genocidal) intent must be met.80 In addition, in the posterior Krstic´
Footnote 77 continued
requirement that the resulting crime was a natural and foreseeable consequence of
the JCE’s execution. It is to be distinguished from the subjective state of mind,
namely that the accused was aware that the resulting crime was a possible conse-
quence of the execution of the JCE, and participated with that awareness’’.
78 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Decision on interlocutory Appeals, Case No. IT-99-36-A,
ICTY Appeals Chamber, 19 March, 2004, § 6.
79 Prosecutur v. Milosˇevic´, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Case
No. IT-02-54, ICTY Trial Chamber, 16 June, 2004, §§ 291 et seq.
80 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra note 35, § 530; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Decision on
Motion for Acquittal pursuant to Rule 98bis, Case No. IT-99-36, ICTY Trial
Chamber, 28 November, 2003, § 30. In this sense also: Cassese, supra note 6, at 121,
133. See also, albeit not clear, the separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen to the
Brdanin Appeals Decision, supra note 78, requiring, on the one hand, speciﬁc intent
‘‘always’’ (§ 4), but, on the other hand, stating that it is shown by JCE III (§ 5). For
speciﬁc intent, also: doctrine, e.g. Mettraux, supra note 71, at 215, 264–265, 289;
Haan, supra note 69, at 198–200; Danner and Martinez, supra note 4, at 151; van
Sliedregt, supra note 1, at 191 et seq.
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Appeal, JCE responsibility of the accused for the genocidal killings
in Srebrenica was dismissed because of lacking a genocidal intent81
and JCE III was not invoked to overcome the mens rea problem.
3.6 Intermediate Result
The result from the above considerations can be summarized as
follows:
(1) JCE I resembles traditional co-perpetration, since the participants
act on the basis of a commonplan (‘‘commondesign’’ or ‘‘common
enterprise’’). If one construes JCE I as containing objective and
subjective elements, in the sense of the functional control concept,
it can be considered as a form of co-perpetration within the
meaning ofArt. 25 (3) (a) alt. 2 ICCStatute and as such as a formof
commission pursuant to Art. 7 (1) ICTY/Art. 6 (1) ICTR Statutes.
(2) JCE II can be treated as a sub-category of JCE I if it is interpreted
narrowly. In a broad sense of an extension of liability JCE II
rather resembles JCE III and thus the following is applicable.82
(3) JCE III cannot be considered as a form of co-perpetration but
only as a form of aiding and abetting the criminal enterprise. JCE
II is an autonomous concept of imputation which does not con-
stitute commission in the sense of Art. 7 (1) ICTY/Art. 6 (1) ICTR
Statutes. In fact, JCE III demonstrates most clearly the JCE
doctrine’s similarity to classical conspiracy liability since it holds
a participant in a criminal enterprise even responsible for the
crimes of other participants not explicitly agreed upon before-
hand provided that they are foreseeable. Thus, the liability is
essentially based on the membership in the group pursuing the
JCE and, as such, conﬂicts with the principle of culpability.
IV APPLICATION BEFORE THE ECCC
4.1 The Test to be Applied: Legality as a Principle in ICL
Art. 33 new (2) refers to Art. 15 ICCPR, and thereby makes the prin-
ciple of legality (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege) part of the ECCC’s
81 Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber,
19 April, 2004, §§ 134 et seq.; therefore, the Chamber convicted Krstic´ ‘‘only’’ for
aiding and abetting genocide.
82 On the disputed correct classiﬁcation see also: V. Haan, supra note 27, at 200,
274 et seq.
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legal regime. Accordingly, ‘‘(N)o one shall be held guilty of any
criminal oﬀence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal oﬀence, under national or international law, at
the time when it was committed.’’ (Art. 15 [1] ICCPR). For the crimes
committed in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979, this means that they
are only encompassed by the ECCC’s jurisdiction if they constituted a
(international or national) criminal oﬀence at that moment in time.
The principle of legality also applies to rules of imputation, as for
example JCE, for these rules link the individual conduct to the crimes
and as such must be considered as the basis for criminal responsibility.
While legality as a human rights principle, as enunciated by Art. 15
(1) ICCPR, appears to be limited to a prohibition of ex post facto
criminalization, in modern ICL the principle contains, on the basis of
general principles of law and as its basic components, not only the lex
praevia but also the lex certa rule.83 As to lex stricta, the situation is
less clear. It may be considered as the equivalent of the rule of strict
construction or interpretation,84 as developed in English law.85
Accordingly, judges are required to interpret the criminal law strictly,
favoring the defendant in case of doubt. Yet, if one understands the
lex stricta requirement only in the sense of the prohibition of analogy
in malam partem, it is diﬃcult to apply it in (traditional) common law
jurisdictions, since there, the recourse to analogy is not prohibited,
but must rather be seen as part of the discovery process of judicial
law-making86 – as far as judicial law-making is still accepted (as in the
legal systems of the United Kingdom). Art. 22 to 24 of the ICC
83 See also A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed., 2006), 68: ‘‘governed
by rules which are ﬁxed, knowable, and certain’’; also: A.P. Simester and G.R.
Sullivan, Criminal Law. Theory and Doctrine (3rd ed., 2007), at 22. The lex certa rule
in US law consists of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court,
see W.R. LaFave, Criminal Law (4th ed., 2003), 103: ‘‘Undue vagueness in the
statute will result in it being held unconstitutional, whether the uncertainty goes to
the persons within the scope of the statute, the conduct which is forbidden, or the
punishment which may be imposed (US v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed
823 [1948])’’ (emphasis added).
84 In this (broad) sense S. Dana, ‘‘Reﬂections on the ICC Sentencing Provisions and
the Rights of the Accused in light of the Nulla Poena Principle’’, in A.H. Klip et al.
(Eds.),Liber Amicorum et Amicarum voor Prof. mr. E. Prakken (2004), 351 at 352–353.
85 J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1960), 38 et seq.; Ashworth,
supra note 83, at 80–82.
86 See R. Haveman, ‘‘The Principle of Legality’’, in R. Haveman et al. (Eds.),
Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (2003), 39 at 47–48 with further
references.
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Statute go beyond these developments since they provide for a
comprehensive concept of nullum crimen, including all four of its
elements generally recognized in civil law jurisdictions: lex praevia,
lex certa, lex stricta and lex scripta.
In any case, as to the case at hand, the gist of the issue is whether the
application of JCE would violate the lex praevia rule, i.e., whether this
form of liability existed at the time of commission in international or
Cambodian criminal law at all. This test has been subdivided by the
Milutinovic Appeals Chamber87 into three requirements which can,
for our purpose, be reformulated as follows:
• JCE must have existed under customary international law at the
relevant time (infra 4.3) or
• it must have been existed in national Cambodian law at the rele-
vant time (4.4) and
• this form of liability must have been suﬃciently accessible and
foreseeable to the defendants at the relevant time (4.5).
The compliance with these requirements, however, does not suf-
ﬁce, since this liability must also be provided for by the applicable
(ECCC) law.88 Indeed, this is the ﬁrst question to be answered in the
following.
4.2 Is JCE Liability Provided for in the ECCC Law?
The ECCC Law’s short provision of individual criminal responsi-
bility, Art. 29, states in its § 1 that ‘‘(A)ny Suspect who planned,
instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed the crimes’’
within the jurisdiction of the ECCC ‘‘shall be individually responsi-
ble.’’ This provision is identical to Art. 7 (1) ICTY and Art. 6 (1)
ICTR Statutes. One may, therefore, ﬁrst refer to the seminal Tadic´
Appeals Chamber’s Judgment as to the interpretation of this provi-
sion, especially of the term committed. This judgment is, however,
not completely clear as to whether participation in a crime by way of
a JCE is encompassed by the term ‘‘committed’’ in Art. 7 (1) ICTY
87 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic´’s Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction – JCE, Case No. IT-99 37, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 21
May, 2003, §§ 20–21. Concurring ‘‘Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal of the Closing Order
against Kaing Guek EAV Duch’ dated 8 August, 2008’’, Case File No. 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC-02), 5 September, 2008, § 49.
88 Milutinovic et al. Decision, supra note 87, § 21; Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal, supra
note 87, § 49.
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Statute. On the one hand, the Chamber acknowledges that ‘‘the
commission of crimes (…) might also occur through participation in
the realization of a common design or purpose’’ and Art. 7 (1) ‘‘does
not exclude those modes of participating in the commission of crimes
which occur where several persons having a common purpose embark
on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some
members of this plurality of persons.’’89 On the other hand, it states
that the ‘‘Statute does not specify (either expressly or by implication)
the objective and subjective elements (actus reus and mens rea) of this
category of collective criminality.’’90 The Statute only provides for an
implicit basis91 of collective participation in a crime in the sense of
common design/purpose, somewhat puzzlingly called ‘‘a form of
accomplice liability’’ by the Chamber.92 The speciﬁc elements of this
liability, in the forms of JCE I, II and III, however, cannot be de-
duced from the Statute, but rather only from customary (case) law.
The subsequent jurisprudence followed this view explicitly or at least
in the sense that it regarded JCE as a form of commission in the sense
of Art. 7 (1).93 The Co-Prosecutors’ Appeals brief follows this view94
and complements it with a purpose based policy argument, namely
that the ECCC’s Law purpose to prosecute the ‘‘Senior Leaders of
Democratic Kampuchea’’ and the ‘‘most responsible’’ can only be
fulﬁlled if JCE is applied.95
This view is ﬂawed for various reasons. First of all, it suﬀers from
a lack of diﬀerentiation with regard to the three forms of JCE. While
JCE I resembles co-perpetration in a traditional sense and as such
can be considered as ‘‘commission’’ within the meaning of Art. 7 (1)
ICTY Statute,96 JCE III only entails accomplice liability and as such
does not constitute commission. As to JCE II, it depends if it is
89 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, §§ 188, 190.
90 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 194.
91 See explicitly: Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 220.
92 Ibid.
93 See: Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, § 29; Vasiljevic´ Appeals
Judgment, supra note 13, § 95; Blasˇkic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 77, § 33;
Milutinovic et al. Decision, supra note 87, § 20–21; Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra note
35, §§ 432, 438. Concurring with this extensive interpretation of Art. 7 (1): Cassese,
supra note 6, at 114; critical Ohlin, supra note 55, at 71–72.
94 Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal, supra note 87, § 50.
95 Ibid., § 51.
96 Cf. Powles, supra note 25, at 610–611; Haan, supra note 69, at 201. See also,
albeit more radically: Prosecutor v. Simic´, Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of
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understood rather in the sense of JCE I or JCE III (supra 3.6). Sec-
ondly, the Co-Prosecutors’ brief does not only ignore these distinc-
tions in its discussion of the ECCC law,97 but leaves the distinction
between JCE I and III consciously open when it proposes to charge
Duch in the alternative either as a co-perpetrator in a JCE (I) or for
the crimes being a natural and foreseeable consequence of the crim-
inal enterprise (JCE III).98 Third, the brief mixes policy arguments
with a literal interpretation of Art. 29 ECCC Law apparently over-
looking that the latter cannot be outplayed by the former. Finally, the
Co-Prosecutors overlook that there is an alternative form of impu-
tation for superiors, i.e., indirect perpetration based on the theory of
control by way of a hierarchical organizational structure. While it
would go beyond the scope of this brief to further analyze this theory,
it is important to note that it has recently been recognized and
explained by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I99 and that it may also be
applied before the ECCC, since it can be considered as a form of
commission, namely a commission through another person (see
explicitly Art. 25 [3] [a] alt. 3 ICC Statute).100
4.3 Did JCE Liability Exist Under Customary (international) Law
at the Relevant Time?
The Tadic´ Appeals Chamber held the view ‘‘that the notion of
common design as a form of accomplice liability is ﬁrmly established
in customary international law.’’101 The Co-Prosecutors’ brief follows
this view, yet, neither the Appeals Chamber nor the Co-Prosecutors
Footnote 96 continued
Judge Lindholm, Case No. IT-95-9/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, 17 October, 2003, §§ 2
et seq. dissociating himself from JCE.
97 Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal, supra note 87, §§ 49 et seq.
98 Ibid., § 72, (d) vs. (e).
99 Katanga & Ngudjolo Conﬁrmation of Charges, supra note 17, §§ 480 et seq.
(‘‘control over the crime approach’’), especially footnotes 647, 678 and corre-
sponding text.
100 See: K. Ambos, ‘‘Art. 25. Individual criminal responsibility’’, in O. Triﬀterer
(Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd ed.
2008), special print, marginal number (mn.) 20; id., ‘‘Command responsibility and
Organisationsherrschaft’’, in A. Nollkaemper and H. van der Wilt (Eds.), System
Criminality in International Law (2008), forthcoming.
101 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 220. See also Martic´ Trial Judgment,
supra note 8, § 435; Martic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, §§ 80, 81; Rukundo
Trial Judgment, supra note 14, § 23; Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 15, § 255.
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take the diﬀerences between the distinct forms of JCE suﬃciently into
account. Also, Tadic´’s recourse to World War II case law is, at least
in part, of ‘‘dubious precedential value.’’102 Thus, if one takes a closer
look at the case law analyzed by the Tadic´ Appeals Chamber, one
reaches a twofold conclusion: while JCE I and II have a basis in
customary law (i.e. post World War II case law), this is not the case
for JCE III.103 From a strict logical perspective, this latter analysis is
not necessary since JCE III is not encompassed, as demonstrated
above (4.2), by Art. 29 (1) ECCC Law. However, for the sake
of completeness, its customary status will also be analyzed as
follows.
4.3.1 JCE I
Art. 6 last paragraph of the Statute of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal and Art. 5 last paragraph of the Statute of the
Tokyo Tribunal established a broad responsibility based on a
common plan providing that ‘‘(L)eaders, organizers, instigators and
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
such plan.’’ Art. II (2) Control Council Law No. 10 establishes that
a person has ‘‘committed’’ a crime when he ‘‘(d) was connected with
plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of
any organization or group connected with the commission of any
such crime.’’ On this basis, the Nuremberg jurisprudence considered
any form of participation – from mere consent to active conduct –
suﬃcient to be held responsible for the crime against peace, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. In the Justice trial these cri-
teria were applied such that Defendants who did not directly
commit crimes were held accountable as accomplices because of a
102 See: Ohlin, supra note 55, at 75. See also: Prosecutor v. Martic´, supra note 8,
Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Individual Criminal Responsibility of
Milan Martic´, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 8 October, 2008, at
134, § 4: ‘‘…nothing but an unsupported dictum.’’
103 I rely here on previous works (supra note 67, Chapter 2 to 4 and ‘‘Individual
criminal responsibility in International Criminal Law: A jurisprudential analysis –
From Nuremberg to The Hague’’ in G.K. McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman
[Eds.], Substantive and procedural aspects of International Criminal Law. The expe-
rience of international and national courts. Volume I. Commentary [2000], 1–31) and
on a recent doctoral thesis written under my supervision: C. Barthe, Joint Criminal
Enterprise. Ein (origina¨r) vo¨lkerstrafrechtliches Haftungsmodell mit Zukunft? (2008),
forthcoming.
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF ON JCE 379
certain bureaucratic or functional involvement in crimes of the Nazi
system. For the ﬁrst time, a type of responsibility based on certain
organizational functions within a bureaucratic apparatus was
developed:
‘‘The charge (…) is that of conscious participation in a nationwide [sic!] government-
organized system of cruelty and injustice, in violation of the laws of war and of
humanity, perpetrated in the name of law by the authority of the Ministry of Justice,
and through the instrumentality of the courts.’’104
Similarly, in U.S. v. Pohl & Others participatory liability was based
on the functional division of diﬀerent tasks which, taken together,
facilitate or promote the commission of the crime. The accused
SS-members ‘‘operated and maintained the gigantic enterprises which
resulted in the unlawful deaths of millions of slave laborers from
occupied territories and prisoners of war.’’105 In sum:
‘‘An elaborate and complex operation, such as the deportation and extermination of
the Jews and the appropriation of all their property, is obviously a task for more
than one man (…). As may be expected, we ﬁnd the various participants in the
program tossing the shuttlecock of responsibility from one to the other. The origi-
nator says: It is true that I thought of the program, but I did not carry it out.’ The
next in line says: I laid the plan out on paper and designated the modus operandi, but
it was not my plan and I did not actually carry it out.’ The third in line says: It is true
I shot people, but I was merely carrying out orders from above.’ The next in line
says: It is true that I received the loot from this program and inventoried it and
disposed of it, but I did not steal it nor kill the owners of it. I was only carrying out
orders from a higher level.’ To invoke a parallelism, let us assume that four men are
charged with robbing a bank. (T)he acts of any of the four, within the scope of the
overall plan, become the acts of all the others’’.106
In the famous trial of the SpecialUnits (Einsatzgruppen) whose taskwas
to ‘‘cleanse’’ the occupied territories in the East from ‘‘elements’’ con-
sidered racially and ethnically inferior by the Nazis, it was argued by
Telford Taylor, Chief of Counsel of the Prosecution, that ‘‘those who
take a consenting part in the commission of crime or are connected with
plans or enterprises involved in its commission (…) and those who be-
long to an organization or group engaged in the commission of crime’’
104 U.S. v. Altstoetter & Others, TWC, Vol. III, at 954–1201, 985. See also: United
Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol.
XV, at 54 et seq. (hereinafter UNWCC Law Reports).
105 U.S. v. Pohl & Others, TWC, Vol. V, at 958–1163, at 1031 (emphasis added).
106 Ibid., at 1173 (supplemental judgment) (emphasis added).
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are responsible as ‘‘accessories.’’107 The decisive fact is that the accused
‘‘were members of Einsatz units whose express mission, well known to
all the members, was to carry out a large scale program of murder. Any
member who assisted in enabling these units to function, knowing what
was afoot, is guilty of the crimes committed by the unit.’’108
The argumentation of the Nuremberg tribunals concerning
reciprocal attribution is reminiscent of the English doctrine of com-
mon design109 in that a plan or collective enterprise serves as the basis
of attribution. The common design doctrine was applied in the British
war crimes trials, as documented by the UNWCC. While as a general
rule it was deemed suﬃcient that the Defendant was ‘‘concerned in the
committing’’ of the crime, in the case of various participants, a
reciprocal attribution of the individual contributions to the (main)
oﬀence was based on the participants having had a common purpose
or plan within the meaning of the common design doctrine. A re-
ciprocal attribution was also recognized in cases of a functional
division of tasks between the accomplices. The most important case
in this respect is the Almelo case where the Judge Advocate argued
that the presence of the four accused in the killing of a prisoner of
war (while ‘‘at the same time taking part in a common enterprise’’)
was suﬃcient to hold all participants responsible for the killing since
‘‘each one in their [sic!] own way’’ assisted ‘‘the common purpose of
all.’’110 In other cases, liability was also based on the existence of
a common purpose or plan111 and, in addition, on the ‘‘being
107 U.S. v. Ohlendorf et al., TWC, Vol. IV, at 372 (emphasis added).
108 Ibid., at 373 (with regard to the accused vonRadetzky, Ruehl, Schuber andGraf).
109 Cf. Ormerod, supra note 50, at 206–219.
110 Trial of Otto Sandrock and three Others, British Military Court for the Trial of
War Criminals held at Almelo, Holland (24–26 November, 1945), UNWCC Law
Reports, Vol. I, at 40.
111 Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen and Others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial
held at Luneburg, Germany (13–23 August, 1946), Judgment of 24 August, 1946, at
241: ‘‘If JEPSEN was joining in this voluntary slaughter of eighty or so people,
helping the others by doing his share of killing, the whole eighty odd deaths can be
laid at his door and at the door of any single man who was in any way assisting in
that act.’’ Trial of Franz Schonfeld and others, British Military Court, Essen, (11–26
June, 1946), UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. XI, 64 at 68: ‘‘In our law, if several persons
combine for an unlawful purpose or for a lawful purpose to be eﬀected by unlawful
means, and one of them, in carrying out the purpose, kills a man, it is murder in all
who are present, whether they actually aid or abet or not, provided that the death
was caused by a member of the party in the course of his endeavors to eﬀect the
common object of the assembly.’’ (emphasis added).
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concerned’’ in the respective criminal oﬀence.112 Thus, in sum, it can
be concluded that JCE I liability was already recognized by the post
World War II case law, and therefore, did also exist at the time of the
commission of the crimes in question in Cambodia.
4.3.2 JCE II
As to the concentration camp cases covered by JCE II, the relevant
case law has also been documented by the UNWCC. In the Dachau
concentration camp trial,113 all accused were convicted on the basis of
the concept of ‘‘acting in pursuance of a common design.’’114
According to the Chief Prosecutor’s closing argument ‘‘the test to be
applied is not did he kill or beat or torture or starve, but did he, by his
conduct, aid or abet the execution of this common design and par-
ticipate in it?’’115 The Prosecution had to prove that (1) in Dachau
existed a system for the mistreatment of prisoners or the commission
of other crimes, (2) the respective accused knew of this system and (3)
encouraged, aided and abetted or participated in the implementation
of this system.116 If an accused only performed ‘‘neutral acts’’ in this
system, i.e., the medical or service personnel, it had to be proved that
this person abused his position to mistreat prisoners.117 In the Belsen
112 Trial of Robert Holzer et al., Canadian Military Court, Aurich, Germany, Re-
cord of Proceedings (25 March–6 April, 1946), Vol. I, Royal Canadian Air Force
(RCAF)Binder 181.009, at 340; Trial of Valentin Feurstein andOthers, Proceedings of
a War Crimes Trial held at Hamburg, Germany (4–24 August, 1948), Judgment of 24
August, 1948,Original transcripts in PublicRecordOﬃce,Kew,Richmond (England),
summing up of the Judge Advocate 14th day (24 August, 1948), at 7: ‘‘(…) an accused,
before he can be found guilty, must have been concerned in the oﬀence. (…) [I]n other
words, he must be the cog in the wheel of events leading up to the result which in fact
occurred.’’ (The mens rea required in this case, i.e. knowledge of the common purpose,
was diﬀerent from the one – ‘‘shared criminal intent’’ – in Tadic´, see supra note 13 and
main text); Trial of Max Wielen and 17 Others, British Military Court, Hamburg,
Germany, (1 July–3 September, 1947), UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. XI, at 46: ‘‘(…)
persons concerned must have been part of the machine doing some duty, carrying out
some performance which went on directly to achieve the killing…’’ See also: UNWCC
Law Reports, Vol. XV, at 49 et seq.; Ambos, supra note 67, at 142–143.
113 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine others, General Military
Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany (15 November–13
December, 1945), UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. XI, 5–17.
114 Cf. UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. XV, at 94–95.
115 Dachau Trial, supra note 113, at 12 (emphasis added).
116 Ibid., at 13.
117 Ibid.
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Trial,118 dealing with the crimes committed in the notorious con-
centration camps of Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen, the Judge Advo-
cate also relied on the concept of a ‘‘common concerted design’’ or
‘‘common agreement’’ to build his case against the accused:
‘‘The case for the Prosecution (is) that all the accused employed on the staﬀ at
Auschwitz knew that a system and a course of conduct was in force, and that, in one
way or another in furtherance of a common agreement to run the camp in a brutal way,
all those people were taking part in that course of conduct. (…) the particular oﬀender
was acting willingly as a party in the furtherance of this system. (…) if the Court were
satisﬁed that they were doing so, then they must, each and every one of them, assume
responsibility for what happened. (…) throughout these camps the staﬀ were made
quite clearly to understand that the brutalities, ill-treatment, and matters of that kind
would not be punished if they took place at the expense of the Jews; and that there was
a common concerted design of the staﬀ to do these terrible things.’’119
In the Hadamar-120 and Velpke-Childrens’ Home cases,121 the
Courts had to deal with crimes committed by the accused as civilians
in the exercise of their professions (for example as nurse). The basis of
the reciprocal attribution of the respective acts of the accused again
was apparently the collective system of mistreatment and abuses in
which the accused consciously took part. As to Hadamar, the Pros-
ecutor spoke of a ‘‘murder factory’’ where ‘‘you have to have several
people doing diﬀerent things (…) and you cannot draw a distinction
between the man who may have initially conceived the idea of killing
them and those who participated in the commission of those of-
fences.’’122 As a consequence, ‘‘there is no question (…) that any
person, who participated in that matter, no matter to what extent,
technically is guilty of the charge that has been brought (…). (E)very
single one of the accused has overtly and aﬃrmatively participated in
this entire network that brought about the illegal results.’’123
118 Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 Others, British Military Court, Luneburg (17
September–17 November, 1945), UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. II, 1–156.
119 Ibid., at 120 (emphasis added).
120 Trial of Alfons Klein and six others, United States Military Commission ap-
pointed by the Commanding General Western Military District, U.S.F.E.T.,
Wiesbaden, Germany (8–15 October, 1945), UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. I, 46–54.
121 Trial of Heinrich Gerike and seven others, British Military Court, Brunswick
(20 March–3 April, 1946), UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. VII, 76–81, quoted in:
Kvocˇka Trial Judgment, supra note 19, § 300 et seq.
122 Quoted according to A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd ed. 2008), at
197.
123 Ibid. (emphasis added).
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Finally, the ‘‘common intent’’ or ‘‘common design’’ also served as
the basis of attribution in the Flossenburg-124 and Mauthausen-Tri-
als.125 According to the latter,126 the mere employment in a con-
centration camp or the mere presence entails a presumption of
responsibility for war crimes.127 This, however, goes too far since it
implies a reversal of the burden of proof as to the speciﬁc crimes.
Indeed, the accused, being part of the organization of the camp,
would have to refute the presumption by proving that he did not
participate in the speciﬁc crimes.128 According to the UNWCC’s
comments129 on the Mauthausen trial, it contains two ‘‘ﬁndings of
fact’’ and one legal conclusion. As to the former, it is said that the
running of the Mauthausen concentration camp constituted a
‘‘criminal enterprise’’ and that everybody who worked in the camp or
was merely present was aware of the ‘‘common design’’ and the
criminal character of the enterprise. In legal terms, it is concluded
that everybody who participated in this criminal enterprise is guilty of
the violation of the laws and customs of war. In sum, three common
elements to establish liability follow from the relevant case law:
124 Trial of Friedrich Becker and others, United States Military Court, Dachau,
Germany (14 May, 1946–22 January, 1947), quoted in UNWCC Law Reports, Vol.
XV, at 95, footnote 1.
125 General Military Government Court of the U.S. Zone, Dachau, Germany (29
March–13 May, 1946), also called ‘‘Mauthausen Concentration Camp Case’’, quoted
in the Dachau Trial, supra note 113, at 15.
126 UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. XI, at 15.
127 Ibid. See also the UNWCC comments on the Dachau-Trial, UNWCC Law
Reports, Vol. XI, 15 et seq., as well as the Kvocˇka Trial Judgment, supra note 19, §
278.
128 The German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) has, in the ‘‘Ausschwitz
Concentration Camp Case‘‘ (in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, Vol. XXI, at 838 et seq.,
882), rejected such a broad liability arguing that it would even cover conduct which
in no way encourages or supports the commission of speciﬁc crimes (also quoted in
Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 203 fn. 254). See also the Kvocˇka Trial
Judgment, supra note 19, § 286: ‘‘The man who merely cleans the oﬃce afterhours
and, however, sees the child photos and knows that the company is participating in
criminal activity and who continues to clean the oﬃce, would not be considered a
participant in the enterprise because his role is not deemed to be suﬃciently signif-
icant in the enterprise.’’ For a diﬀerent, stricter view: F. Bauer, ‘‘Ideal-oder Real-
konkurrenz bei nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen?’’, (1967) 22 Juristenzeitung 625 et
seq.
129 UNWCC comments on the Dachau-Trial, UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. XI, 15
et seq.
KAI AMBOS384
• ‘‘there was a system in force to commit certain oﬀences’’
• ‘‘the accused was aware of the system’’ and
• ‘‘the accused participated in operating the system.’’130
4.3.3 JCE III
While the above considerations show that JCE I and II have a basis in
the post World War II case law, this is not the case with regard to JCE
III. From the case law referred to by the Tadic´Appeals Chamber, only
the Essen Lynching case131 contains elements of the ‘‘common pur-
pose’’ or ‘‘common design’’ doctrines insofar as the killings were
attributed to all the accused on this basis (on their being concerned in
the killing of the three unidentiﬁed British prisoners of war). Yet, it is
not – inter alia because of the absence of conclusions by a Judge
Advocate – clear whether the tribunal convicted the three accused on
the basis of a shared intent with regard to the killing of the accused
(i.e., pursuant to JCE I) or – as submitted by the Tadic´ Appeals
Chamber132 – on the basis of the foreseeability doctrine, i.e. that it was
foreseeable (objectively or subjectively) for all accused that the pris-
oners would be killed. In a similar vein, the Borkum Island Case,133
another case of mob violence, constitutes – on the basis of the case
made by the Prosecution – proof of recourse to JCE I rather than JCE
III. The Prosecution described the accused in this case as ‘‘cogs in the
wheel of common design,’’ each wheel on its own indispensable for the
commission of the crime (‘‘the wheel of wholesale murder could not
turn without all the cogs.’’) Accordingly every person accused who
‘‘played his part in mob violence which led to the unlawful killing
of the seven American ﬂyers’’ had to be convicted of murder.134
Consequently, the Appeals Chamber itself concedes that this case
130 UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. XV, 89 at 95. See especially: Dachau Trial, supra
note 113, at 13, 15.
131 Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British Military Court for the Trial of War
Criminals, Essen (18–19 and 21–22 December, 1945), UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. I,
at 88.
132 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 209.
133 See for further information on the Borkum Island Case: Tadic´ Appeals Judg-
ment, supra note 5, § 210–213.
134 Compare Charge Sheet, U.S. National Archives Microﬁlm Publications, I, at
1190.
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could also be considered as a case of JCE I.135 Last but not least, the
recognition of JCE III in customary law can not be deduced from the
Italian case law quoted by the Appeals Chamber136 either, since in this
trial – in contrast to the trials before British and U.S. American mil-
itary tribunals – no international, but exclusively the national law
(Art. 116 [1] of the Italian Codice Penale137) was applied. In addition,
this case law is not uniform, since the Italian Supreme Court (Corte
Suprema di Cassazione) has adopted two dissenting decisions.138
4.4 Did JCE Liability exist in Cambodian National Law at the
Relevant Time?
The applicable criminal law at the relevant time is the Cambodian
Penal Code of 1956. There is not yet a full translation of this Law into
English or French, but an unoﬃcial English translation was provided
for this brief. This translation can be contrasted to two other sources
available to the author.
According to the Commentary on the ‘‘Projet de Nouveau Code
Penal’’, coordinated by Michel Bonnieu, traditional Cambodian law
distinguished between dangerous and not dangerous perpetrators
(‘‘malfaiteur dangereux’’ and ‘‘non dangereux’’) and Art. 76 of the
Codes of 1929 and 1955 (1956) deﬁned the ‘‘auteur’’ (perpetrator) as
the person who commits crimes (‘‘infractions qu’ell commet…’’).139
Co-perpetration was deﬁned as ‘‘co-action’’ (coaction) in the Codes of
1929 and 1956, and its most important requirement was a common
agreement between the co-perpetrators.140 Accordingly, by its
wording, the provision did not encompass acts outside the agreement;
135 ‘‘It bears emphasizing that by taking the approach just summarized, the
Prosecutor substantially propounded a doctrine of common purpose which pre-
supposes that all the participants in the common purpose shared the same criminal
intent, namely, to commit murder. In other words, the Prosecutor adhered to the
doctrine of common purpose mentioned above with regard to the ﬁrst category of
cases.’’ (emphasis added).
136 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 214–219.
137 On this provision see: F. Mantovani, Diritto penale (5th ed. 2007), at 523–527;
A. Crespi, F. Stella and G. Zuccala`, Commentario breve al Codice Penale (8th ed.
2006), at 465–470.
138 Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, § 219 and fn. 277, 278.
139 M. Bonnieu et al., Projet de Nouveau Code Penal. Commente´ et compare´ (2008),
at 13.
140 Ibid., at 14 according to which the new Art. L. 1121–1122 requires a ‘‘commun
accord’’.
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these could only be punished as complicity.141 In fact, according to
the unoﬃcial English translation, Art. 82 distinguishes between a
direct and indirect participation and qualiﬁes only the former as
co-perpetration and the latter as complicity. According to Art. 87,
aiding or abetting requires ‘‘assistance with full knowledge.’’ An aider
or abettor can only be considered a co-perpetrator ‘‘when he/she
makes the oﬀenses realized,’’ i.e., when he/she him-/herself realizes
the oﬀence.
The Co-Prosecutors’ Appeals Brief refers to Art. 82 and 145 of the
1956 Code stating that Art. 82 distinguishes between ‘‘co-action’’ and
‘‘complicity’’. Art. 145 provides for a deﬁnition of ‘‘co-authorship’’
referring to a plurality of persons who ‘‘confer or consult’’ with a
view to the commission of a crime. An aider and abettor is considered
an accomplice, not a co-author. Apart from the reference to Art. 145,
which is not mentioned in any of the other available sources, the
Appeals Brief correctly reproduces the applicable law at the time of
commission. Given the inﬂuence of French Criminal Law in Cam-
bodia, it is not surprising that the applicable French Code Pe´nal of
the time (the Code Pe´nal of 1810,142 Art. 59, 60), while it does not
deﬁne diﬀerent forms of perpetration, distinguishes between ‘‘auteur’’
(perpetrator) and ‘‘complice’’ (aider and abettor, accomplice) and
thus conﬁrms, at least, the model of participation followed by the
Cambodian Code.
Thus, in sum, as to the recognition of JCE liability in Cambodian
law at the relevant time, it follows that only JCE I existed unam-
biguously while JCE III was clearly not encompassed by the Code of
1956. As to JCE II, it depends if one construes it as a sub-category
of JCE I or rather an extension of responsibility within the meaning
of JCE III (see supra 3.6 no. 2).
4.5 Was the Existing Liability Suﬃciently Accessible and Foreseeable
to the Defendants at the Relevant Time?
Taking into account the above considerations, the answer to this ﬁnal
question is clear. First of all, only JCE I and II existed in customary
international law at the relevant time. Thus, the question is, ﬁrst,
whether liability based on a common purpose, design or plan was
suﬃciently accessible and foreseeable to the defendants. The existence
141 See the comment on Art. L. 1121-1125 in Ibid., at 15.
142 Accessible at http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/la_legislation_criminelle/anciens_
textes/code_penal_de_1810.htm (visited 20th October, 2008).
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of this liability not only in customary international law but also – as
‘‘co-authorship’’ – in the applicable Cambodian Penal Code dem-
onstrates that this form of liability was accessible and foreseeable.
Second, as to JCE II, it only existed as a sub-category of JCE I at the
relevant time, and only insofar can be considered as suﬃciently
accessible and foreseeable.
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